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m (→Sinistra Globale versus Destra Globale: Dal 1945 ad oggi) |
m (→Sinistra Globale versus Destra Globale: Dal 1945 ad oggi) |
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di Immanuel Wallerstein | di Immanuel Wallerstein | ||
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| + | ====English version==== | ||
| + | Commentary No. 449, May 15, 2017 | ||
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| + | "Global Left vs. Global Right: From 1945 to Today" | ||
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| + | The period 1945 to the 1970s was one both of extremely high capital accumulation worldwide and the geopolitical hegemony of the United States. The geoculture was one in which centrist liberalism was at its acme as the governing ideology. Never did capitalism seem to be functioning as well. This was not to last. | ||
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| + | The high level of capital accumulation, which particularly favored the institutions and people of the United States, reached the limits of its ability to guarantee the necessary quasi-monopoly of productive enterprises. The absence of a quasi-monopoly meant that capital accumulation everywhere began to stagnate and capitalists had to seek alternative modes of sustaining their income. The principal modes were to relocate productive enterprises to lower-cost zones and to engage in speculative transfer of existing capital, which we call financialization. | ||
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| + | In 1945, the geopolitical quasi-monopoly of the United States was faced only with the challenge of the military power of the Soviet Union. In order to ensure its quasi-monopoly, the United States had to enter into a tacit but effective deal with the Soviet Union, nicknamed "Yalta." This deal involved a division of world power, two-thirds to the United States and one-third to the Soviet Union. They mutually agreed not to challenge these boundaries, and not to interfere with each other's economic operations within their sphere. They also entered into a "cold war," whose function was not to overthrow the other (at least in a foreseeable future) but to maintain the unquestioned loyalty of their respective satellites. This quasi-monopoly also came to an end because of the growing challenge to its legitimacy from those who lost out by the status quo. | ||
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| + | In addition, this period was also one in which the traditional antisystemic movements called the Old Left - Communists, Social-Democrats, and National Liberation Movements - came to state power in various regions of the world-system, something that had seemed highly improbable as late as 1945. One-third of the world was governed by Communist parties. One-third was governed by Social-Democratic parties (or their equivalent) in the pan-European zone (North America, western Europe, and Australasia). In this zone, power alternated between Social-Democratic parties that embraced the welfare state, and Conservative parties that also accepted the welfare state, only seeking to reduce its extent. | ||
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| + | And in the last region, the so-called Third World, national liberation movements come to power by winning independence in most of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, and promoting popular regimes in already independent Latin America. | ||
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| + | Given the strength of the dominant powers and especially the United States, it might seem anomalous that antisystemic movements came to power in this period. In fact, it was the opposite. In seeking to resist the revolutionary impact of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements, the United States favored concessions with the hope and expectation that they would bring to power "moderate" forces in these countries that would be willing to operate within accepted norms of interstate behavior. This expectation turned out to be correct. | ||
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| + | The turning point was the world-revolution of 1968, whose dramatic if short-lived upsurge of 1966-1970 had two major results. One was the end of the very long dominance of centrist liberalism (1848-1968) as the only legitimate ideology in the geoculture. Instead, both radical leftist ideology and rightist conservative ideology regained their autonomy and centrist liberalism was reduced to being only one of three competing ideologies. | ||
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| + | The second consequence was the worldwide challenge to the Old Left by movements everywhere that asserted that the Old Left was not antisystemic at all. Their coming to power had changed nothing of any importance, said the challengers. These movements were now seen as part of the system that had to be rejected in order that truly antisystemic movements take their place. | ||
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| + | What happened then? In the beginning the newly-assertive Right seemed to win the day. Both U.S. President Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher proclaimed the end of previously dominant "developmentalism" and the advent of production oriented to world market sale. They said that "there is no alternative" (TINA). Given the decline of state income in most of the world, most governments sought loans, which they only received if they accepted the new terms of TINA. They were required to reduce drastically the size of governments and eliminate protectionism, while ending welfare state expenditures and accepting the supremacy of the market. This was called the Washington Consensus, and almost all governments complied with this major shift of focus. | ||
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| + | |||
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| + | Governments that didn't comply fell from office, culminating in the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union. After some time in office, the compliant states discovered that the promised rise in real income of both governments and most workers did not occur. Instead, these compliant states were suffering from the austerity policies imposed upon them. There was a reaction to TINA, marked by the 1995 Zapatista uprising, the 1999 successful demonstrations against the attempt in Seattle to enact mandatory guarantees for so-called intellectual property rights, and the 2001 founding in Porto Alegre of the World Social Forum in opposition to the World Economic Forum, long-standing pillar of TINA. | ||
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| + | As the Global Left regained strength, conservative forces needed to regroup. They shifted from exclusive emphasis on market economics, and launched their alternative socio-cultural face. They initially spent much energy on such issues as anti-abortion and insistence on exclusive heterosexual behavior. They used such themes to pull supporters into active politics. And then they turned to xenophobic anti-immigration, embracing the protectionism that the economic conservatives had specifically opposed. | ||
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| + | However, supporters of expanded social rights for everyone and "multiculturalism" copied the new political tactics of the right and successfully legitimated over the last decade significant advances on socio-cultural issues. Women's rights, first Gay rights and then Gay marriage, rights of "indigenous" peoples all became widely accepted. | ||
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| + | So, where are we? The economic conservatives first won out and then lost strength. The succeeding socio-cultural conservatives first won out and then lost strength. Yet the Global Left seems nonetheless to flounder. This is because they have not yet been willing to accept that the struggle between the Global Left and the Global Right is a class struggle and that this should be made explicit. | ||
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| + | In the ongoing structural crisis of the modern world-system, which began in the 1970s and will probably last another 20-40 years, the issue is not the reform of capitalism, but its successor system. If the Global Left is to win that battle, it must solidly ally the anti-austerity forces with the multicultural forces. Only recognizing that both groups represent the same bottom 80% of the world's population makes it likely that they can win out. They need to struggle against the top 1% and seek to attract the other 19% to their side. That is exactly what one means by a class struggle. | ||
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| + | by Immanuel Wallerstein | ||
Versione delle 09:42, 20 mag 2017
Sinistra Globale versus Destra Globale: Dal 1945 ad oggi
Commento No. 449, 15 maggio 2017
Il periodo 1945-1970 ha visto sia una accumulazione di capitale estremamente alta in tutto il mondo sia l'egemonia geopolitica degli Stati Uniti. La geocultura era un liberalismo centrista al suo apice come ideologia di governo. Sembrava che mai il capitalismo avesse funzionato così bene. Questo non poteva durare.
L'elevato livello di accumulazione di capitale, che ha particolarmente favorito le istituzioni e il popolo degli Stati Uniti, ha raggiunto i limiti della sua capacità di garantire il necessario quasi-monopolio delle imprese produttive. L'assenza di un quasi-monopolio significava che l'accumulazione di capitali in tutto il mondo cominciò a ristagnare e che i capitalisti dovessero ricercare modi alternativi per sostenere i loro redditi [Nota del Traduttore: Quasi-Monopolio definisce una sorta di monopolio in cui esiste più di un fornitore per un particolare bene/servizio. Wallerstein afferma che i quasi-monopoli sono auto-liquidatori perché nuovi venditori entrano nel mercato esercitando pressioni politiche per aprire i mercati alla concorrenza]. I principali modi possibili erano quelli di trasferire le imprese produttive in zone a costi inferiori e ad impegnarsi in un trasferimento speculativo del capitale esistente, che noi chiamiamo finanziarizzazione.
Nel 1945, il quasi-monopolio geopolitico degli Stati Uniti dovette confrontarsi solo con la sfida rappresentata dal potere militare dell'Unione Sovietica. Al fine di garantire il suo quasi-monopolio, gli Stati Uniti dovettero entrare in un accordo tacito ma efficace con l'Unione Sovietica, che venne definito come "l'accordo di Yalta". Questo accordo ha coinvolto una divisione del potere mondiale, due terzi agli Stati Uniti e un terzo all'Unione Sovietica. Entrambi concordarono reciprocamente di non sfidare questi confini e di non interferire con le loro operazioni economiche all'interno della loro sfera. Entrarono anche in una "guerra fredda", la cui funzione non era di rovesciare l'altro (almeno in un futuro prevedibile) ma quella di mantenere una fedeltà senza dubbi da parte dei rispettivi satelliti. Questo quasi-monopolio è terminato anche a causa della crescente sfida alla sua legittimità da parte di coloro che hanno perso il loro status quo.
Inoltre, in questo periodo i tradizionali movimenti antisistemici chiamati la Vecchia Sinistra - Comunisti, Socialdemocratici, e i Movimenti di Liberazione Nazionale - sono venuti al potere statale in varie regioni del sistema mondiale, cosa che sembrava estremamente improbabile fino al 1945. Un terzo del mondo era governato dai partiti comunisti. Un terzo è stato governato da partiti socialdemocratici (o equivalenti) nella zona paneuropea (Nord America, Europa occidentale e Australasia). In questa zona, il potere si alternò tra partiti socialdemocratici che abbracciarono lo stato di benessere e partiti conservatori che hanno anche accettato lo stato sociale, solo cercando di ridurre la sua portata.
E nell'ultima regione, il cosiddetto Terzo Mondo, i movimenti di liberazione nazionale vengono al potere conquistando l'indipendenza nella maggior parte dell'Asia, dell'Africa e dei Caraibi e promuovendo regimi popolari in una America Latina già indipendente.
Data la forza dei poteri dominanti e specialmente degli Stati Uniti, potrebbe sembrare anomalo che i movimenti antisistemici venissero al potere in questo periodo. Infatti, avvenne il contrario. Nel cercare di resistere all'impatto rivoluzionario dei movimenti anti-coloniali e anti-imperialisti, gli Stati Uniti hanno favorito le concessioni con la speranza e l'attesa che esse avrebbero portato al potere in questi paesi forze "moderate" disposte ad operare secondo norme accettate e comportamenti interstatali. Questa aspettativa si è rivelata corretta.
Il punto di svolta fu la rivoluzione mondiale del 1968 la cui drammatica, anche se di breve durata, impennata nel 1966-1970 portò due importanti risultati. Uno era la fine della lunga dominanza del liberalismo centrista (1848-1968) come l'unica ideologia legittima nella geocoltura. Al contrario, sia l'ideologia radicale di sinistra che l'ideologia conservatrice di destra hanno riacquistato la loro autonomia e il liberalismo centrista è stato ridotto ad essere solo una delle tre ideologie concorrenti.
La seconda conseguenza fu la sfida mondiale alla Vecchia Sinistra da parte di movimenti che affermavano ovunque che la Vecchia Sinistra non era affatto antisistema. L'arrivo al potere della Vecchia Sinistra non aveva comportato cambiamenti di una qualche importanza, dicevano gli sfidanti. I "vecchi" movimenti erano ora considerati come parte del sistema che doveva essere rifiutato in modo che movimenti veramente anti-sistema assumessero il loro posto.
E poi che è successo? All'inizio la Destra resa nuovamente audace sembrava vincere la partita. Sia il presidente Usa Reagan che il primo ministro U.K. Thatcher hanno proclamato la fine dello "sviluppismo" precedentemente dominante e l'avvento della produzione orientata alla vendita all'interno del mercato mondiale. Hanno proclamato che "non c'è alternativa" (TINA) [Nota del Traduttore: TINA There Is No Alternative]. Data la diminuzione del reddito statale in gran parte del mondo, la maggior parte dei governi ha cercato prestiti, che hanno ricevuto solo se accettavano i nuovi termini di TINA. Essi erano tenuti a ridurre drasticamente la dimensione dei governi ed eliminare il protezionismo, fermando le spese dello stato sociale e accettando la supremazia del mercato. Questo è stato chiamato il "Washington Consensus" (Consenso a Washington), e quasi tutti i governi hanno rispettato questo importante cambiamento di focus.
I governi che non erano d'accordo sono caduti, con crolli culminati nello spettacolare collasso dell'Unione Sovietica. Gli Stati che erano d'accordo, dopo un po 'di tempo, scoprirono che non era avvenuto l'aumento promesso del reddito reale sia dei governi che della maggior parte dei lavoratori. Invece, questi stati che concordavano soffrivano dalle politiche di austerità imposte su di loro. Ci fu una reazione alla TINA, segnata dalla rivolta zapatista del 1995, dalle dimostrazioni di successo del 1999 contro il tentativo di Seattle di emanare garanzie obbligatorie per i cosiddetti diritti di proprietà intellettuale, dalla fondazione infine nel 2001 a Porto Alegre del World Social Forum in opposizione al Forum Economico Mondiale, pilastro di TINA a lungo termine.
Mentre la Sinistra Globale riprendeva forza, le forze conservatrici avevano la necessità di ricongiungersi. Si sono spostati dall'enfasi esclusiva sull'economia di mercato e hanno lanciato il loro volto socio-culturale alternativo. Hanno inizialmente speso molta energia su questioni come l'anti-aborto e l'insistenza su un comportamento eterosessuale esclusivo. Usavano tali temi per attirare i sostenitori in una politica attiva. E poi si sono rivolti ad una polemica anti-immigrazione xenofoba, abbracciando il protezionismo che i conservatori economici avevano espressamente opposto.
Tuttavia, i sostenitori dei diritti sociali ampliati per tutti e il "multiculturalismo" hanno copiato le nuove tattiche politiche della destra legittimando con successo nell'ultimo decennio progressi significativi sui temi socio-culturali. I diritti delle donne, i diritti di gay e poi il matrimonio gay, i diritti dei popoli "indigeni" sono diventati ampiamente accettati.
Allora, dove siamo? I conservatori economici prima hanno vinto e poi hanno perso forza. I successivi conservatori socio-culturali prima hanno vinto e poi hanno perso forza. Eppure la Sinistra Globale sembra comunque annaspare. Questo perché non sono ancora disposti ad accettare che la lotta tra la Sinistra Globale e la Destra Globale sia una lotta di classe e che questo deve essere reso esplicito.
Nella crisi strutturale in atto nel sistema mondiale moderno, iniziata negli anni '70 e che probabilmente durerà altri 20-40 anni, la questione non è la riforma del capitalismo, ma il sistema che lo sostituerà. Se la Sinistra Globale deve vincere questa battaglia, deve costruire una solida alleanza tra le forze anti-austerità con le forze multiculturali. Solo riconoscendo che entrambi i gruppi rappresentano lo stessa base, l'80% della popolazione mondiale, rende probabile che possa vincere. Hanno bisogno di lottare contro il 1% che sta in cima e cercare di attirare al loro fianco il restante 19%. Questo è esattamente quello che si intende per una lotta di classe.
di Immanuel Wallerstein
English version
Commentary No. 449, May 15, 2017
"Global Left vs. Global Right: From 1945 to Today"
The period 1945 to the 1970s was one both of extremely high capital accumulation worldwide and the geopolitical hegemony of the United States. The geoculture was one in which centrist liberalism was at its acme as the governing ideology. Never did capitalism seem to be functioning as well. This was not to last.
The high level of capital accumulation, which particularly favored the institutions and people of the United States, reached the limits of its ability to guarantee the necessary quasi-monopoly of productive enterprises. The absence of a quasi-monopoly meant that capital accumulation everywhere began to stagnate and capitalists had to seek alternative modes of sustaining their income. The principal modes were to relocate productive enterprises to lower-cost zones and to engage in speculative transfer of existing capital, which we call financialization.
In 1945, the geopolitical quasi-monopoly of the United States was faced only with the challenge of the military power of the Soviet Union. In order to ensure its quasi-monopoly, the United States had to enter into a tacit but effective deal with the Soviet Union, nicknamed "Yalta." This deal involved a division of world power, two-thirds to the United States and one-third to the Soviet Union. They mutually agreed not to challenge these boundaries, and not to interfere with each other's economic operations within their sphere. They also entered into a "cold war," whose function was not to overthrow the other (at least in a foreseeable future) but to maintain the unquestioned loyalty of their respective satellites. This quasi-monopoly also came to an end because of the growing challenge to its legitimacy from those who lost out by the status quo.
In addition, this period was also one in which the traditional antisystemic movements called the Old Left - Communists, Social-Democrats, and National Liberation Movements - came to state power in various regions of the world-system, something that had seemed highly improbable as late as 1945. One-third of the world was governed by Communist parties. One-third was governed by Social-Democratic parties (or their equivalent) in the pan-European zone (North America, western Europe, and Australasia). In this zone, power alternated between Social-Democratic parties that embraced the welfare state, and Conservative parties that also accepted the welfare state, only seeking to reduce its extent.
And in the last region, the so-called Third World, national liberation movements come to power by winning independence in most of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, and promoting popular regimes in already independent Latin America.
Given the strength of the dominant powers and especially the United States, it might seem anomalous that antisystemic movements came to power in this period. In fact, it was the opposite. In seeking to resist the revolutionary impact of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements, the United States favored concessions with the hope and expectation that they would bring to power "moderate" forces in these countries that would be willing to operate within accepted norms of interstate behavior. This expectation turned out to be correct.
The turning point was the world-revolution of 1968, whose dramatic if short-lived upsurge of 1966-1970 had two major results. One was the end of the very long dominance of centrist liberalism (1848-1968) as the only legitimate ideology in the geoculture. Instead, both radical leftist ideology and rightist conservative ideology regained their autonomy and centrist liberalism was reduced to being only one of three competing ideologies.
The second consequence was the worldwide challenge to the Old Left by movements everywhere that asserted that the Old Left was not antisystemic at all. Their coming to power had changed nothing of any importance, said the challengers. These movements were now seen as part of the system that had to be rejected in order that truly antisystemic movements take their place.
What happened then? In the beginning the newly-assertive Right seemed to win the day. Both U.S. President Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher proclaimed the end of previously dominant "developmentalism" and the advent of production oriented to world market sale. They said that "there is no alternative" (TINA). Given the decline of state income in most of the world, most governments sought loans, which they only received if they accepted the new terms of TINA. They were required to reduce drastically the size of governments and eliminate protectionism, while ending welfare state expenditures and accepting the supremacy of the market. This was called the Washington Consensus, and almost all governments complied with this major shift of focus.
Governments that didn't comply fell from office, culminating in the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union. After some time in office, the compliant states discovered that the promised rise in real income of both governments and most workers did not occur. Instead, these compliant states were suffering from the austerity policies imposed upon them. There was a reaction to TINA, marked by the 1995 Zapatista uprising, the 1999 successful demonstrations against the attempt in Seattle to enact mandatory guarantees for so-called intellectual property rights, and the 2001 founding in Porto Alegre of the World Social Forum in opposition to the World Economic Forum, long-standing pillar of TINA.
As the Global Left regained strength, conservative forces needed to regroup. They shifted from exclusive emphasis on market economics, and launched their alternative socio-cultural face. They initially spent much energy on such issues as anti-abortion and insistence on exclusive heterosexual behavior. They used such themes to pull supporters into active politics. And then they turned to xenophobic anti-immigration, embracing the protectionism that the economic conservatives had specifically opposed.
However, supporters of expanded social rights for everyone and "multiculturalism" copied the new political tactics of the right and successfully legitimated over the last decade significant advances on socio-cultural issues. Women's rights, first Gay rights and then Gay marriage, rights of "indigenous" peoples all became widely accepted.
So, where are we? The economic conservatives first won out and then lost strength. The succeeding socio-cultural conservatives first won out and then lost strength. Yet the Global Left seems nonetheless to flounder. This is because they have not yet been willing to accept that the struggle between the Global Left and the Global Right is a class struggle and that this should be made explicit.
In the ongoing structural crisis of the modern world-system, which began in the 1970s and will probably last another 20-40 years, the issue is not the reform of capitalism, but its successor system. If the Global Left is to win that battle, it must solidly ally the anti-austerity forces with the multicultural forces. Only recognizing that both groups represent the same bottom 80% of the world's population makes it likely that they can win out. They need to struggle against the top 1% and seek to attract the other 19% to their side. That is exactly what one means by a class struggle.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
